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1 Introduction 
As the food prices soared in 2007–08, public interest and criticism were shown towards 
the performance of the Finnish food chain. Especially, concentration in retail sectors 
and consequent decrease in the degree of competition has been a concern around 
Europe. It seems evident that the concentration has impacted food prices negatively. On 
the other hand, concentrated retail sector provides counterbalance to concentrated food 
industry. (Björkroth et al. 2012.) In the context of the Finnish food chain, the degree of 
concentration is distinctive in the retail and the dairy processing sector. During 2007–
09, the producer and the consumer price of dairy products increased more on average in 
Finland than in Eurozone. The evidence suggests that the degree of competition 
decreased in processing and in wholesale of dairy products during 2001–07. (Kotilainen 
et al. 2010.) 
 
Concentration in certain market is often associated with market power, but 
concentration is not necessary caused by the decreased degree of competition. Before 
drawing conclusions about concentration and market power, presence and the degree of 
market power should first be proven. (Briones & Rakotoarisoa 2013.) New Empirical 
Industrial Organization (NEIO) framework has been widely used to measure the degree 
of market imperfections. It has been applied to various industries, yet food industry has 
been studied most extensively. (Kaiser & Suzuki 2006, 4.) 
 
Only few studies have attempted to measure the degree of market power in the Finnish 
dairy chain. Ulvinen (2006) concluded that processing, the wholesale and the retail 
sector are competitive despite the high degree of concentration. Čechura, Žáková 
Kroupová and Hockmann (2015) studied oligopoly power of European dairy processing 
sectors and provided estimates for Finland among other countries. In their approach, 
NEIO was combined with the stochastic frontier analysis. Market power in the Finnish 
dairy chain has not been examined with a bilateral oligopoly approach before. The 
approach allows relaxing the presumptions about price taking. 
 
In the Finnish dairy chain, the wholesale–retail sector was able to increase its share 
from the consumer price by nearly four percent during 2008–12, whereas the share of 
the dairy industry remained unchanged. In the dairy chain, processing sector has 
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stronger position towards wholesale–retail sector than in other food chains in Finland. 
On the other hand, increased production of private label products has caused revenues to 
transfer from the processing sector to the wholesale–retail sector. (Peltoniemi et al. 
2015.) 
 
In this study, the Finnish dairy chain was analyzed. Retail and independent wholesale 
firms are considered as a joint sector in the context of the empirical analysis. Word 
retail sector, or retailer, thus refers to both if wholesale sector, or wholesaler, is not 
explicitly mentioned. Wholesale market, on the other hand, refers to the market between 
processors and retailers and retail market to the market between retailers and 
consumers. The objective of the study was to examine market power between dairy 
processors and retailers, and to determine whether retailers have market power over 
consumers. The analysis was limited to the wholesale and the retail market of dairy 
products. Another aim was to estimate the degree of market power if detected. NEIO 
provided methodological framework for the study. The approach by Schroeter et al. 
(2000) was applied in the empirical analysis. 
 
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the methodological 
framework and basic concepts concerning imperfect competition. Previous studies 
about market power in dairy chains are introduced in Chapter 3. A review on the 
development and the current state of the dairy processing and the retail sector in Finland 
is also provided. Chapter 4 presents the approach used in the empirical analysis as well 
as methods and data used in the estimation. The results are presented in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and discussion. 
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2 A Review on Framework for the Study of Market Power 
In economic theory, Industrial Organization (IO) refers to the study of imperfect 
competition (Cabral 2000, 3). The first section provides the definition of IO and 
presents its history briefly. It also provides the definition of market power and discusses 
the implications of market power. The second section presents the elementary theory 
about profit maximization under imperfect competition and strategic interaction 
between firms.  The third section discusses the NEIO paradigm. 
 
2.1 Industrial Organization and Market power 
According to Cabral (2000, 3), IO studies the performance of markets and industries 
with an emphasis on how firms compete. Kaiser and Suzuki (2006, 5) emphasize that 
the motivation of IO is to provide political guidance. Tirole (1990, 3), on the other hand, 
avoids defining IO exactly, but he emphasizes the role of market structure and the 
behavior of firms in the paradigm. 
 
The history of IO begins from the so-called Harvard tradition. One of the founding 
assumptions in this tradition was that market structure determines market conduct, e.g. 
prices and investments. Market conduct eventually leads to performance which is 
observed through profits or the ratio between the price and the marginal cost. Because 
of these three causal parts, the paradigm is known as Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP). It was empirical by nature and aimed to explain performance measures with the 
structure and conduct variables, e.g. concentration ratios and advertising to sales ratios. 
This approach was contested by more theoretical approach, known as Chicago tradition. 
Still, the study of IO was about to renew. There was dissatisfaction towards the 
empirical work of the earlier IO, and interest among economic theorists towards IO was 
increasing in 1970s. A new tradition began to form and it was theoretical by nature. It 
adapted game theory as a unified framework for the analysis. (Tirole 1990, 1–3.) 
 
Kaiser and Suzuki (2006, 5–6) discuss the political motivation of the previous 
approaches. Although both Harvard and Chicago tradition considered perfect 
competition as a benchmark, they disagreed on how markets should be guided towards 
competitive equilibrium. According to the Harvard tradition, a policy restricting the 
concentration of industry improved welfare and was necessary for a market to reach 
9 
 
 
competitive equilibrium. The Chicago tradition, on the other hand, advocated a view 
which stated that markets, even with one firm, adjust towards competitive equilibrium, 
and government interventions only disturb this adjustment. 
 
According to Cabral (2000, 6) the object of IO reduces to market power. He specifies 
four questions to be answered. First, is there any market power? Second, how is market 
power acquired and maintained? Third, are there implications from market power? 
Fourth, how should market power be regulated? Cabral (2000, 7) mentions two ways to 
acquire market power: legal protection from competition and strategic interaction. On 
the other hand, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013, 375–387) name three sources for market 
power: number of firms, strategic interaction between firms and elasticity of demand or 
supply. 
 
Market power is defined as the ability of seller or buyer to affect prices in a market. 
Under perfect competition, an individual firm does not have such ability, but the price is 
determined by the supply and the demand in the market. Market power is also known as 
monopoly power when sellers are concerned and, respectively, as monopsony power in 
the case of buyers. In reality, most firms have at least some market power. In technical 
terms, price exceeds the marginal cost of production when market power is present. 
This difference between the price and the marginal cost is known as mark-up, or mark-
down in the case of buyer. (Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2013, 357–388.)  
 
The societal implications of market power are ambiguous. It is beneficial for a firm to 
have market power, but higher price implies transfer from consumers to firms. In 
general, market power implies inefficiency in several ways. The quantity is smaller 
which causes society to be worse-off. For a given price, the optimal output is lower for 
a firm with market power than for a firm in a perfectly competitive market. Facing less 
competition, firms in an imperfectly competitive market also have less incentive to 
improve efficiency. Market power may cause rent seeking which means that firms use 
their resources to maintain their market power. For a society, it proves to be 
unproductive. (Cabral 2000, 8–9.) Firms may do rent seeking in several ways. They 
may promote laws which prevents or complicates entering the market. They may also 
promote laws which grant them market power. Resources may also be used for legal 
services which aim to prevent accusations concerning misuse of market power. Surplus 
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capacity can be built to make entering the market seem less attractive. (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld 2013, 378–379.) 
 
On the other hand, market power can enhance welfare through technological 
development. Cabral (2000, 292–295) reminds that, although firms with market power 
have less incentive to invest in research and development, large firms proved to be the 
main source of technological progress. They have more resources to invest into research 
and development. According to Cabral, the ultimate optimality implies some degree of 
market power in the short run and continuous adjustment towards perfect competition in 
the long run. 
 
2.2 Profit Maximization and Strategic Interaction under Imperfect Competition 
This section presents the profit maximization of a firm under imperfect competition. At 
first, strategic interaction between firms is ignored and monopolistic competition is 
assumed. In this case, market demand determines the price and the quantity for an 
oligopolistic firm. Respectively, the supply determines the price and the quantity for an 
oligopsonistic firm. If a firm has market power, it can, in theory, choose either the price 
or the quantity and take the other as given. Thus, changing the quantity will change the 
price and vice versa. Because of this relation, the marginal revenue of an oligopolistic 
firm or the marginal cost of an oligopsonistic firm is not constant. Marginal revenue and 
marginal cost are presented in terms of algebra in Equation 1. 
 
 𝛥𝑟 = 𝛥𝑐 = 𝑝𝛥𝑞 + 𝑞𝛥𝑝 (1) 
 
In Equation 1, r denotes revenue, c denotes cost, p denotes price and q denotes quantity. 
Term Δ means that the previous value is subtracted from the current value. If quantity 
can only be changed, price is presented as the function of quantity, i.e. inverse demand 
function. If the difference is considered as a small increase, it can be expressed as a 
derivative. (see e.g. Varian 2006, 277–283 & 423–425.) 
 
An oligopolistic firm adjusts the amount of production and an oligopsonistic firm 
adjusts the amount of inputs it buys. The optimum for an oligopolistic firm implies that 
the marginal revenue from an output equals the marginal cost of producing the output. 
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The input demand of a buyer is also known as the marginal expenditure. In the case of 
an oligopsonistic firm, the marginal revenue from an input should equal the marginal 
cost of the input. By rearranging the terms in Equation 1 and by presenting differences 
as derivatives, profit maximization condition is obtained (Equation 2). 
 
 𝑚𝑐 = 𝑚𝑟 =
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑞
= 𝑝 +
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑞
𝑞 (2) 
 
In Equation 2, mc refers to marginal cost and mr to marginal revenue. Equation 3 shows 
the profit maximization condition after the rearrangement of the terms in Equation 2. 
 
 𝑚𝑐 = 𝑚𝑟 =
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑞
= 𝑝 (1 +
1
𝜀
) (3) 
 
In Equation 3, term ε denotes the elasticity of demand or supply depending on the 
context. (see e.g. Varian 2006, 424–425 & 471–473.) 
 
Equation 3 implies that the marginal revenue equals to the price only when ε is 
infinitely large. As the elasticity grows, mark-up or mark-down decreases and market 
performance moves towards perfect competition. In the case of an oligopolistic firm, ε 
denotes the elasticity of demand. The term is negative in this case so the marginal 
revenue must be less than or equal to the price. This implies further that the quantity 
under imperfect competition is smaller than or equal to the quantity under perfect 
competition. If the quantity is smaller, the price is higher, and therefore the price under 
imperfect competition is higher than or equal to the price under perfect competition. In 
the case of an oligopsonistic firm, ε denotes the elasticity of supply. The term is positive 
so the marginal revenue is greater than or equal to the price. In this case, the equilibrium 
quantity is smaller than or equal to the quantity under perfect competiton, and the 
equilibrium price is lower than or equal to the price under perfect competition. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2. (see e.g. Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2013, 368–388; Varian 
2006, 424–425 & 471–473.) 
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Figure 1. Market equilibrium in case of oligopoly and oligopsony 
 
Game theory has been used to model strategic interaction between firms. In the basic 
game setting, firms are making decisions concerning only price or quantity. If one firm 
dominates the market, the game is sequential by nature. The dominating firm chooses its 
quantity or price first and other firms make their decisions based on that choice. If no 
dominant firm exist, it is reasonable to assume that firms make their decisions 
simultaneously based on their expectations. Simultaneous quantity setting is known as 
the Cournot model and simultaneous price setting as the Bertrand model. One possible 
outcome is collusion in which firms cooperate to maximize total profits in a market. 
(Varian 2006, 480–498.) 
 
The Cournot model is presented more closely because it will be further applied in the 
context of the NEIO models. Let 𝑞 = 𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  be the total output and 𝑝(𝑞) =
𝑝(𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ) the price. Because the output decision of a firm is dependent on the 
decisions of other firms, the output of firm i is expressed as a reaction function 𝑦𝑖 =
𝑓(∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ). The profit maximization condition of firm i is 𝑝(𝑞) +
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑞
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚𝑐(𝑦𝑖). If 
multiplied by 
𝑞
𝑞
, the condition becomes 𝑝(𝑞) (1 +
𝜕𝑝(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
𝑞
𝑝(𝑞)
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
) = 𝑚𝑐(𝑦𝑖). By denoting  
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
 by si the condition takes the form shown in Equation 4. 
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 𝑝(𝑞) (1 +
𝑠𝑖
𝜀(𝑞)
) = 𝑚𝑐(𝑦𝑖) (4) 
 
In the Cournot model, firms assume their rivals to continue producing the output they 
previously did. A single firm chooses the output based on the expected output of other 
firms. Because of this fundamental assumption, adjustment towards the equilibrium is a 
problematic concept in the Cournot model. Only at the equilibrium, where the reaction 
curves crosses, firms actually produce the expected output (Figure 2). Once the 
equilibrium is found, no firm find it profitable to change the output and the equilibrium 
is maintained. (Varian 2006, 480–498.) 
 
 
Figure 2. The reaction curves of two firms and the Cournot equilibrium 
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2.3 New Empirical Industrial Organization 
New empirical industrial organization is an approach for measuring market 
imperfections. Because of its theoretical nature, the later IO did not contribute much to 
the empirical research and the IO models were not oriented to estimate welfare losses. 
NEIO, on the other hand, has strong emphasis on empirical research. In NEIO, the 
degree of market power is estimated directly using conduct parameters. The paradigm 
has generalized structural models to allow imperfect competition. (Kaiser & Suzuki 
2006, 3–13) 
 
Studies by Iwata (1974), Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) are 
among the most influential pioneering works in NEIO. There are few fundamental 
differences between NEIO and SCP. While SCP applies accounting data to determine 
economic price-cost margins, NEIO does not consider the margins directly observable. 
Another major difference between the paradigms is that inference in SCP is always 
based on cross-sectional comparison, whereas NEIO focuses on a single industry. In a 
typical study, a single industry is analyzed using an econometric model which follows 
closely the economic theory. (Bresnahan 1989.) 
 
Authors have discovered several ways to classify the NEIO models. Kaiser and Suzuki 
(2006, 13) distinguish two categories. First, there are the generalized Cournot models 
which are homogenous oligopoly settings in which quantity serves as the strategic 
variable. Secondly, there are the generalized Bertrand models in which products are 
differentiated and price serves as the strategic variable. Sheldon and Sperling (2003) 
classify the models into two approaches. In the so-called production theoretic approach, 
a system with three equations is estimated. A system includes a production, a cost and a 
demand function. In the so-called general identification method, only two equations are 
required implying that the price elasticity is not constant. Roy, Kim and Raju (2006) on 
the other hand, name two popular methods. The conjectural variations method is based 
on conduct parameters, and the menu approach is based on comparison of the models. 
 
In NEIO, the empirical models include a conduct parameter which shows the degree of 
market power. To derive the parameter, consider the quantity setting problem shown in 
Equation 5. 
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 max
𝑦𝑖
𝑟(𝑦𝑖) = 𝑝 (𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑗(𝑦𝑖)
𝑖≠𝑗
) 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑐(𝑦𝑖) (5) 
 
Term 𝑟(𝑦𝑖) denotes firm i ‘s revenue function, and 𝑐(𝑦𝑖) is the respective cost function. 
Using the previous notation, the first order condition for profit maximization is shown 
in Equation 6. 
 
 
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= 𝑝(𝑞) +
𝜕𝑝(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
(1 +
𝜕 ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
𝜕𝑦𝑖
) 𝑦𝑖 −
𝜕𝑐(𝑦𝑖)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= 0 (6) 
 
Term 
𝜕 ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
𝜕𝑦𝑖
 expresses the conjectural variations. It shows how much the total output 
of other firms change as one firm changes its output. Term (1 +
𝜕 ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
𝜕𝑦𝑖
) equals 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑦𝑖
. 
When further elaborated, Equation 6 becomes 
𝜕𝑐(𝑦𝑖)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= 𝑝(𝑞) +
𝜕𝑝(𝑞)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
(
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
)
𝑞
𝑝(𝑞)
𝑝(𝑞). 
Denote term (
𝜕𝑝(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
𝑞
𝑝(𝑞)
) by 
1
𝜀
 and term (
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
) by 𝜃𝑖. The latter is known as the 
conjectural elasticity. The obtained profit maximization condition is shown in Equation 
7.  
 
 
𝜕𝑐(𝑦𝑖)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= 𝑝(𝑞) (1 +
𝜃𝑖
𝜀
) (7) 
 
Parameter θ, which indicates the degree of market power, can have values between zero 
and one. If zero, the right-hand side of Equation 7 reduces to p(q). In this case, a market 
proves perfectly competitive. If the value of the parameter is one, a market is monopoly 
or collusion. Intermediate values imply that the structure of a market lies between 
perfect competition and monopoly. (Kaiser & Suzuki 2006, 13–17.) 
 
If Cournot behavior is assumed, the conjectural elasticity can be further elaborated. 
Term 
𝜕 ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
𝜕𝑦𝑖
 becomes zero as firms do not expect anyone to change their output. This 
is shown in Equation 8. 
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 𝑝(𝑞) + (
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
)
1
𝜀
𝑝(𝑞) = 𝑚𝑐𝑖 (8) 
 
After dividing by p and rearranging the terms, Equation 8 can be expressed as the 
Lerner index as shown in Equation 9. 
 
 
(𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐𝑖)
𝑝
=
𝜃𝑖
𝜀
= 𝐿𝑖 (9) 
 
Term Li denotes the Lerner index value of firm i. If market shares are summed up and 
multiplied by the term 
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
, the average value for a market is obtained. This is shown in 
Equation 10. 
 
 
(𝑝 − ∑ 𝑚𝑐𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑞 )
𝑝
=
∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝜀
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
=
𝜃
𝜀
 (10) 
 
The right-hand side of Equation 10 can also be written as the Herfindahl index as shown 
in Equation 11. 
 
 ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝜀
𝑦𝑖
𝑞
=
∑ (
𝑦𝑖
𝑞 )
2
𝜀
=
𝐻
𝜀
 
(11) 
 
Term H denotes Herfindahl index which is the measure of market concentration. This 
result is consistent with Equation 4. If all firms have a similar marginal cost structure, 
the conjectural elasticity equals H. In this case, the inverse of the number of firms 
shows the degree of market power. (Kaiser & Suzuki 2006, 13–17.) Because the 
conjectural variations are dynamic by nature, the static models, which most of the NEIO 
models are, can be considered as logically inconsistent. This can be circumvented by 
giving parameter θ a generic interpretation, e.g. the measure of market power. (Perloff 
1991.) 
 
Despite the development of the models in NEIO, the shortage of proper data makes the 
empirical research challenging. Kaiser and Suzuki (2006, 347) note that most of the 
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applied data in NEIO studies is highly aggregate over space, product and time. They 
recommend using more disaggregate data and emphasize that the optimal solution is to 
use firm level panel data. The sensitivity of the results causes another challenge. 
Perekhozhuk et al. (2016) show that the approach, functional form and statistical 
estimation method may have a substantial impact on results and propose presenting a 
comparison of different specifications and estimation methods in the study. They also 
note that most the NEIO models form nonlinear systems which frequently fail to 
converge. It is also reminded by Bresnahan (1989; see also Sheldon & Sperling (2003)) 
that, although NEIO has provided a way to measure market power, it has not been able 
to detect the causes of market power. 
 
The models have become more sophisticated and more diverse. Rezitis and Kalantzi 
(2012) studied the food manufacturing industry in Greece. They applied a model which 
lends the idea of inter-industry comparison from the SCP studies and takes it to the 
NEIO context. The panel consisted of sectors in the Greek food industry and estimates 
were provided for each sector and for the food industry as a whole. Some studies aim to 
estimate market power simultaneously in more than one stage of the food chain. For 
example, Cakir and Balagtas (2012) employed double a mark-up model in which 
producers were allowed to have market power over a joint processing–retailing stage 
and that in turn over consumers. In the model applied by Moro, Sckokai and Veneziani 
(2012), processors were allowed to have market power over producers and retailers 
were allowed to have market power over both processors and consumers. Furthermore, 
this model estimated simultaneously the supply and demand of three meat products. 
Some studies aimed to combine NEIO with other paradigms. For example, Čechura et 
al. (2015) applied the stochastic frontier analysis in NEIO context, and Grau and 
Hockmann (2016) combined the time series techniques to NEIO. 
 
Although several models allow market power in various stages, models allowing 
bilateral market power are not that common. Kaiser and Suzuki (2006, 345) emphasize 
the need to develop these models. The approach of Schroeter, Azzam and Zhang (2000) 
has been further applied by Kinoshita, Suzuki and Kaiser (2006) and Scalco and Braga 
(2015). Similar models have been developed inter alia by Raper, Love and Shumway 
(2000), Chung and Tostão (2012) and Park, Chung and Raper (2016). 
  
18 
 
 
3 A Review on Dairy Chains and Market Power  
Market power in the dairy chains have been extensively studied using the NEIO models. 
Studies cover several dairy products and different parts of the chain. Some of the studies 
are presented in the first section. The second section provides insight to the Finnish 
dairy chain focusing on the dairy processing sectors. In addition to the current state and 
the structure of the dairy processing and the retail sector, the section presents some of 
the trends and major events which have had a substantial impact on the chain.  
  
3.1 Market Power in Dairy Chains 
Dairy chains have been of special interest in the NEIO literature. Perekhozhuk, Grings 
and Glauben (2009) studied oligopsony power in the Ukrainian dairy processing sector. 
They estimated the conduct both at the national and the regional level using monthly 
data which covered the period 1996–2003. They discovered no market power at the 
national level but rejected the hypothesis of perfect competition at the regional level. 
Two of the regional conduct parameters were significant at 10% level and two at 15% 
level. In these regions, prices were 3.6–46.7% lower than the value of the marginal 
product. 
 
Similarly, Perekhozhuk et al. (2011) examined oligopsony power in the Hungarian dairy 
processing sector but the data was even more disaggregated. They applied plant-level 
panel data with 432 annual observations during 1993–2006. They discovered market 
power and the values of the conduct parameters were 0.22 and 0.3 in two out of four 
models. Cakir and Balagtas (2012) examined whether the federal regulations in the 
USA provided market power to the farmer co-operatives during 2000–07. The data 
comprised statistics from ten federal milk marketing order regions. They discovered that 
farmer cooperatives had approximately 9% mark-up while the joint processing–retailing 
stage had less than 1% mark-up. 
 
Scalco and Braga (2014) studied oligopsony power of the dairy processors in Brazil. 
The regional level data with monthly observations covered the period 1997–2011. The 
conduct parameters were close to zero thus indicating no evidence for market power. 
Another study by Scalco and Braga (2015) examined the market of UHT milk in Brazil. 
The model allowed bilateral market power in the wholesale market. The data consisted 
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of 66 observations covering the period 2004–09. They discovered that the retailers have 
market power over the processors but not over the consumers. The processors have no 
market power. The value of the conduct parameter was around 0.638. They concluded 
that the market is far from perfect competition. 
 
Sckokai et al. (2013) estimated market power of the retailers in the case of two Italian 
quality cheeses. The model allowed retailers to have market power over both processors 
and consumers. They considered the period 2002–08, and there were 84 observations in 
the data set. They found that the retailers have market power over the consumers but not 
over the processors in the case of the Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese. The conduct 
parameter was 0.25 on average. Mérels (2009) also studied market power concerning 
quality cheeses. He examined whether the processors had oligopoly power in the market 
of the Comté cheese during 1985–2005. No market power was found. 
 
The study by Čechura, Žáková Kroupová and Hockmann (2015) examined whether the 
European dairy sectors have oligopoly power. They had panel data which covered the 
period 2003–12. They provided estimates for the Finnish dairy sector, and the mark-up 
related to Finland was among the highest. They concluded that the degree of market 
power is modest on average. The average mark-up was 0.121 in the EU and 0.15 in 
Finland. They also examined whether the development of mark-up follows some linear 
trend. The average trend was decreasing but the mark-up increased in Finland during the 
period. 
 
The Finnish studies concerning market power in the domestic dairy chain are few. Two 
studies were found but neither used a NEIO model. Kotilainen et al. (2010) examined 
the development of food prices and market performance in Finland. The period under 
consideration was 2001–07. The dairy processing and the dairy wholesale sector were 
examined more thoroughly. Profitability and concentration in the sectors was measured 
with six different indicators. They discovered that the competition in the dairy 
processing and the dairy wholesale sector diminished during the period. They also 
discovered that the profitability in both the sectors was lower than the average 
profitability of the sectors in the EU. They did not, however, provide any estimates 
concerning market power. On the other hand, Ulvinen (2006) found no evidence for 
market power in the dairy processing, the food wholesale and the retail sector despite 
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the high level of concentration. She estimated the Lerner-index values for 2003 which 
were lower than 0.05 in all the sectors. 
 
3.2 The Dairy Processing and the Retail Sector in Finland 
The dairy processing sector has been highly significant part of the Finnish food 
industry. It has developed considerable value-added products, and dairy products has 
been the only group of food products with positive trade balance throughout the EU era. 
(Jansik, Niemi & Toikkanen 2015; see also Peltoniemi et al. 2015.) According to Jansik 
(2014), however, the future of the sector remains uncertain because the increasing level 
of competition and imports may cause domestic production to decrease in the era after 
the milk quota system. 
 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the cooperative ideology was adopted from 
Denmark. Cooperatives became popular for various reasons which were mainly 
patriotic and economical. The dairy processing sector went through considerable 
changes. Previously, most of the dairies were privately-owned and located at manors. 
However, a remarkable number of cooperative dairies were founded when the ideology 
became widely known. (Korhonen 1998, 47–56.) Valio, the biggest dairy firm in 
Finland, was incorporated as a central organization in 1905 by 17 dairy cooperatives. A 
year later, it had 80 dairies as members, and the number of members peaked in 1938 
when there was 563 members. (Perko 2005, 12.) In 2014, the company was, again, 
owned by 17 dairy cooperatives. According to its statistics, it collects around 85% of 
the milk produced in Finland. (Valio 2014.) 
 
Some structural indicators for the dairy processing sector are presented in Table 1. The 
turnover is presented in the monetary values of the 2000. The number of enterprises has 
followed a declining trend, while the trend in the number of employees has been 
increasing. On the other hand, the amount of milk has mostly declined, while the 
turnover of the sector has mostly increased. These trends indicate the increase in the 
degree of concentration and the higher value-added of the production.  
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Table 1. The selected key figures for the Finnish dairy processing sector 
 
 
Currently, the sector is dominated by cooperatives, and almost all the raw milk 
produced in Finland is collected by dairy cooperatives. Besides Valio, also 
Hämeenlinnan Osuusmeijeri, Maitomaa and Satamaito, which are considerable dairy 
firms in Finland, are owned by dairy cooperatives. Another remarkable firm in the 
market is Arla which is a subsidiary company of Arla Foods. Originally, there was 
Ingman Foods, a privately-owned Finnish dairy firm, and it was first partially and later 
completely bought by Arla Foods. (Arla.) The parental company Arla Foods is currently 
the fifth largest dairy firm in the world (Arla Foods). Kaslink Foods and Juustoportti are 
significant privately-owned firms. Nestlé and Unilever produce most of the Finnish ice-
cream. The Finnish share from the total turnover in the Baltic Sea region has decreased, 
and the domestic dairy firms have lost their shares to foreign firms in the Finnish market 
(Jansik, Irz & Kuosmanen 2014). Table 2 presents some of the largest dairy firms in 
Finland and their market shares in 2014. Valio held 69.2% of the market and Arla 
slightly over 15%. Together they held 84.3% of the total revenue in the sector. 
 
Table 2. Seven largest dairy firms in Finland and their market shares 
 
 
2000 88 1726 4978 2371
2005 74 1743 4644 2293
2008 71 2121 5031 2188
2012 59 2213 5342 2188
2014 61 2154 5708 2289
Source: Statistics Finland a & Luke
TurnoverEnterprises Employees
Received milk 
(million liters)
Valio 1714.0 69.2 % 69.2 % 3734
Arla 373.0 15.1 % 84.3 % 281
Hämeenlinnan Osuusmeijeri 69.5 2.8 % 87.1 % 82
Kaslink Foods 58.1 2.3 % 89.4 % 111
Maitomaa 54.5 2.2 % 91.6 % 52
Maitokolmio 42.3 1.7 % 93.3 % 80
Satamaito 46.3 1.9 % 95.2 % 57
Whole industry 2476.5 100.0 % 100.0 % 4902
Source: Statistics Finland a & Kauppalehti
Turnover 
(M€)
Market 
share
Employees
Cumulative 
concentration
22 
 
 
Recently, the sector went through two considerable events. In 2012, Finnish 
Competition and Consumer Authority accused Valio of predatory pricing in fluid milk 
products and imposed a considerable penalty payment to the company. The authority 
was able to prove that Valio aimed to drive Arla Ingman out from the market by setting 
its prices below the production costs. This also forced smaller companies to set their 
prices the unprofitable level. (Kilpailuvirasto 2012.) Another considerable event was the 
trade embargo against Russia in 2014. In 2013, the sector made its record in revenue 
and in exports to Russia. Nevertheless, dairy products were most affected as the food 
exports were suspended. (Jansik, Niemi & Toikkanen 2015). 
 
Concentration in the Finnish retail sector has grown and currently two companies 
dominate the sector. Two trends can be recognized in Finnish food retail. Firstly, the 
number of outlets and the amount of revenue have grown in the sector of specialized 
food retail. Secondly, discount stores and private label products have become more 
popular due to increased price sensitivity. The share of private labels has grown rapidly 
in dairy products. In addition, the threat of imports and narrowed selection have 
increased competition among the suppliers and decreased their margins. (Jansik, Niemi 
& Toikkanen 2015.) 
 
Since 1990, the structure of the Finnish retail sector has changed substantially (Table 3). 
K-group was the dominating firm then, and the rest of the market was mostly shared by 
three smaller companies. In 2005 however, S-group had grown bigger than K-group, 
and their common market share reached almost 70%. Concentration has increased 
further, and the common share was 78.6% in 2015. K-group was founded in 1940 as 
four regional wholesale companies merged as Kesko. The company does procurement, 
provides business support and coordinates cooperation of the shareholder-retailers. 
(Kesko 2016.) S-group, which is cooperative by nature, was founded in 1904. As 
Kesko, SOK Corporation was similarly founded to jointly procure, consult and 
coordinate regional cooperative facilities of the member retailers. (S-kanava.) 
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Table 3. The market shares of some Finnish retail companies in the selected years 
 
  
1990 2005 2015
K-group 40.5 % 33.9 % 32.7 %
S-group 15.9 % 35.9 % 45.9 %
T-group 23.8 % - -
Tradeka / Suomen 
Lähikauppa
14.4 % 10.8 % 6.4 %
Spar - 6.2 % -
Lidl - 3.7 % 9.0 %
Others 5.4 % 9.5 % 6.0 %
CR2 64.3 % 69.8 % 78.6 %
Source: Finnish Grocery Trade Association (2016), 
Finnish Food Marketing Association and the 
Kehittyvä Kauppa magazine (2006) & Niilola et al. 
(2003)
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4 Materials and Methods 
In this chapter, the empirical analysis is described. The first section presents the 
approach. The second section provides a brief introduction to Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) which has been used in the statistical estimation. The section also 
presents the statistical diagnostic tests which have been used in the estimation. In the 
third section, issues related to the data and the variables are discussed. 
 
4.1 The Approach Applied in the Analysis 
The approach by Schroeter et al. (2000) was adopted for the empirical analysis. It is 
based on three basic market structures, and each structure is modelled as a nonlinear 
system of equations. The models are then compared. Quantity, wholesale price and 
retail price of dairy products are the endogenous variables of the models. The 
homogeneity of products and fixed-proportions transformations, e.g. transportation and 
storage in retail level, are assumed. The assumptions justify the same variable for 
quantity in wholesale and in retail market. In each of the models, retailers may have 
market power over consumers but there are three possible scenarios when it comes to 
the market power in wholesale market. 
 
In the first structure, the wholesale market is assumed to be competitive. This structure 
is called Bilateral Price-Taking (BPT). In this case, the marginal revenue of retailers 
equals retail price if retailers have no market power over consumers. If retailers do have 
market power over consumers, their marginal revenue is lower than the retail price. The 
net marginal revenue of retailers determines their input demand. It is obtained by 
subtracting marginal revenue from marginal cost. The equilibrium condition for the 
wholesale market in the BPT model implies that the marginal cost of processors equals 
the net marginal revenue of retailers. This condition also determines the wholesale 
price. 
 
In the second structure, processors are price takers while retailers are allowed to have 
market power over processors. This structure is called Manufacturer Price-Taking 
(MPT). Retailers face processors supply which is determined by the processors’ 
marginal cost of production. If retailers have oligopsony power, their marginal 
expenditure is higher than the processors’ marginal cost. In the MPT model, the 
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equilibrium condition for the wholesale market implies that net marginal revenue of 
processors equals their marginal expenditure. The wholesale price is determined by the 
marginal cost of processors. 
 
In the third structure, retailers are price takers while processors are allowed to have 
market power over retailers. This structure is called Retailer Price-Taking (RPT). 
Processors face the input demand of retailers which is determined by the net marginal 
revenue of retailers. If processors have oligopoly power, their marginal revenue is lower 
than the net marginal revenue of retailers. In the RPT model, the equilibrium condition 
for the wholesale market implies that the marginal cost of processors equals their 
marginal revenue. In this case, the wholesale price is determined by the net marginal 
revenue of retailers. 
 
The mathematical derivation of the models covers the rest of this section. The main 
steps of the calculation are provided here but more explicit derivation is provided in 
Appendix 1. Consider first the BPT model. The inverse consumer demand of dairy 
products is presented in Equation 12. 
 
 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖 (12) 
 
Term pr denotes the retail price of dairy products in the Finnish market, q denotes the 
quantity of dairy products in the Finnish market, and variables x2 and x3 denote demand 
shifters. The interaction term is needed for the identification of the conduct parameter as 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) have shown. Term ϵ is a stochastic error term. The 
marginal cost of the Finnish retailers is presented in Equation 13. 
 
 𝑚𝑐𝑟 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂 (13) 
 
Term w2 is a cost shifter related to the retailers, and η is an error term. The marginal cost 
of the Finnish dairy processors is presented in Equation 14. 
 
 𝑚𝑐𝑝 = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + 𝑐3𝑣3𝑞 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 (14) 
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Variables v are cost shifters related to the processors, and μ is an error term. Variables 
𝑑𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑛 are dummy variables which capture additional shocks in the supply. 
Schroeter et al. (2000) have shown that the interaction term is also needed in the 
processors’ marginal cost equation for the market power to be identified. 
 
The marginal revenue of retailers is presented in Equation 15. 
 
 𝑚𝑟𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 (15) 
 
The term λ is added in accordance with Equation 7, and it indicates the degree of the 
retailers’ market power over the Finnish consumers. The net marginal revenue of 
retailers is presented in Equation 16. It is obtained by subtracting the Equation 13 from 
the Equation 15. 
 
 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝑏0 − 𝑏1𝑞 − 𝑏2𝑤2 − 𝜂 (16) 
 
The equilibrium condition in the BPT model implies that 𝑚𝑐𝑝 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟. Equaling 
Equations 14 and 16 and rearranging the terms yields the equilibrium condition which is 
presented in Equation 17. 
 
 
𝑝𝑟 = −[𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1 + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + (𝑏0 + 𝑐0) + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 
+ ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
(17) 
 
The BPT system is completed by adding the supply and the demand equation which 
determine the retail and the wholesale price of dairy products. The processors supply 
implies that 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑚𝑐𝑝. Term pw refers to the wholesale price of dairy products in the 
Finnish market. Equation 17, 12, and 14 thus form the BPT system. 
 
The retailers’ marginal expenditure for the MPT model is derived based on Equation 14. 
The marginal expenditure is presented in Equation 19 in which parameter δ indicates the 
degree of retailers’ monopsony power. 
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 𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 𝑐0 + (1 + 𝛿)(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 (18) 
 
In the MPT model, the equilibrium condition for the wholesale market is 𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟. 
The condition is obtained by equating Equation 16 and 18. The condition is presented in 
Equation 19. 
 
 
𝑝𝑟 = −[𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1 + (1 + 𝛿)𝑐1) − (1 + 𝛿)𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + (𝑏0 + 𝑐0) 
+𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
(19) 
 
The MPT system consists of Equation 19, 12, and 14. If δ is restricted to zero, the model 
reduces to the BPT model. 
 
The processors’ marginal revenue for the RPT model is derived based on Equation 16. 
The marginal revenue is presented in Equation 20 in which parameter γ indicates the 
degree of processors’ monopoly power. 
 
 𝑚𝑟𝑝 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 + 𝛾((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 (20) 
 
In the RPT model, the equilibrium condition for the wholesale market is 𝑚𝑐𝑝 = 𝑚𝑟𝑝. 
The condition is obtained by equating Equation 14 and 20. The condition is presented in 
Equation 21. 
 
 
𝑝𝑟 = −[(𝛾 + 𝜆(1 + 𝛾))(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1(1 + 𝛾) + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 
+(𝑏0 + 𝑐0) + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
(21) 
 
In the RPT model, the wholesale price is determined by the retailers’ input demand. The 
condition states that 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟. Equation 16 thus defines the wholesale price, and 
Equation 21 defines the retail price in the terms of the processors’ marginal revenue. 
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Inserting Equation 21 to Equation 16 the wholesale price in the RPT model is obtained. 
This is shown in Equation 22. 
 
 
𝑝𝑤 = −[𝛾(1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1𝛾 + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + 𝑐0 + 𝑐2𝑣2 
+ ∑ 𝑐0𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇 
(22) 
 
The RPT system consists of Equation 21, 12 and 22. If γ is restricted to zero, the model 
reduces to the BPT model. 
 
The BPT model can be derived from the MPT and the RPT model using parametric 
restrictions, but the MPT model cannot be derived from the RPT model by using 
parametric restrictions and vice versa. Schroeter et al. (2000) suggest creating an 
artificial model which nests the parameters to make this possible. In the nested (NST) 
system, the first equation is a synthetic combination of Equation 20 and 22. This is 
presented in Equation 23. 
 
 
𝑝𝑟 = −[(𝛾 + 𝜆(1 + 𝛾))(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1(1 + 𝛾) + (1 + 𝛿)𝑐1) − 𝑐3(1 + 𝛿)𝑣3]𝑞 
+(𝑏0 + 𝑐0) + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
(23) 
 
The NST system consists of equations 23, 12 and 22. If the parameter δ is restricted to 
zero, the model reduces to the RPT model. Likewise, if the parameter γ is restricted to 
zero, the model reduces to the MPT model. 
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4.2 Statistical Estimation and Hypothesis Testing 
The estimation was performed using GMM. It is a semiparametric method implying that 
distributional assumptions are removed. Semiparametric estimators are more robust 
than parametric estimators. In other words, semiparametric estimators retain important 
statistical properties, e.g. consistency, under fewer assumptions. However, if restrictive 
assumptions can be made concerning for example the distribution of the residuals, 
parametric methods provide more efficient estimators than semiparametric methods. 
(Greene 2003, 447.) The statistical estimation and testing was performed using Stata 
(version 13.0, Statacorp, College station, TX, USA). 
 
Let 𝑦𝑖 = ℎ(𝒙𝑖, 𝜷) + 𝜀𝑖 be some estimated function which may be nonlinear. In the 
expression, term yi denotes the i:th observation of the dependent variable, εi denotes an 
error term related to the i:th observation. Term h(.) denotes the fitted value of the i:th 
observation as a function of independent variables xi and K parameters β. GMM is 
based on the orthogonality conditions which imply that the error terms should not 
correlate with the independent variables or pseudoregressors in the case of nonlinear 
regression. This condition is necessarily violated in the simultaneous equation 
estimation. The estimation needs to be made using instrumental variables which 
correlate with the independent variables but not with the error term, i.e. 𝐸[𝒛𝑖𝜀𝑖|𝒙𝑖] =
𝐸[𝒛𝑖(𝑦𝑖 − ℎ(𝒙𝑖, 𝜷))|𝒙𝑖] = 0. Term zi is a vector of L instrumental variables. Empirical 
moment conditions for a single equation is presented in Equation 24. (Greene 2003, 
533–547.) 
 
 𝒎(𝜷) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝒛𝑖(𝑦𝑖 − ℎ(𝒙𝑖, 𝜷))
𝑛
𝑖=1
=
1
𝑛
∑ 𝒛𝑖𝜀𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 0 (24) 
 
If there are more moment conditions than parameters, the moment equations do not 
have a unique solution. The model is then said to be overidentified. In this case, the 
consistent and efficient estimator is found by minimizing the weighted sum of squares. 
The criterion function is thus a function of estimator β and optimal weighting matrix W 
(Equation 25). 
 
 𝑞 = 𝒎(𝜷)′𝑾𝒎(𝜷) (25) 
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The optimal weighting matrix is the inversion of the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of the empirical moment conditions. This is presented in Equation 26. 
 
 
𝑾 = (
1
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝑖𝜀𝑖, 𝒛𝑗𝜀𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
−1
= (
1
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝒛𝑖𝒛𝑗
′
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
−1
 
=  (
1
𝑛
𝒁′𝜮𝒁)
−1
 
(26) 
 
To allow autocorrelation in the error terms, Σ in Equation 26 can be expressed as 
Newey–West estimator as shown in Equation 27. 
 
 𝜮 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝒛𝑖𝒛𝑗
′𝜀𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑗=1
+
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑤(𝑙)
𝑝
𝑙=1
∑ 𝜀𝑖𝜀𝑖−𝑙(𝒛𝑖𝒛𝑖−𝑙
′ + 𝒛𝑖−𝑙𝒛𝑖
′)
𝑛
𝑖=𝑙+1
 (27) 
 
Term w(l) refers to some weight for a certain lag. Lags should be added until the 
autocorrelation is considered negligible. (Greene 2003, 533–547.) In the estimation, five 
lags were used which was the amount needed to make the overidentification test statistic 
and thus the impact of autocorrelation sufficiently small.  
 
When more equations are estimated simultaneously, the criterion function can be 
presented in matrix form as shown in Equation 28. 
 
 𝑞 = [
𝒎(𝜷1)
𝒎(𝜷2)
⋮
𝒎(𝜷𝑀)
]
′
[
𝑾11 𝑾12 ⋯ 𝑾1𝑀
𝑾21 𝑾22 ⋯ 𝑾2𝑀
⋮
𝑾𝑀1
⋮
𝑾𝑀2
⋱
⋯
⋮
𝑾𝑀𝑀
] [
𝒎(𝜷1)
𝒎(𝜷2)
⋮
𝒎(𝜷𝑀)
] (28) 
 
The optimal weighting matrix consists of the variance-covariance matrices which are 
the covariances of the moment conditions among the equations. (Greene 2003, 409–
410.) 
 
Nonlinear systems are estimated using some numerical method. The Gauss-Newton 
algorithm was applied in the estimation because it was revealed to converge fast. The 
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closed form solution for a nonlinear GMM estimator can be derived using the Gauss-
Newton method. Following Hayashi (2000, 498), the moment conditions are first 
expanded as first-order Taylor series around some initial estimator ?̂?𝑖. Using the 
previous notation, approximations for the empirical moments after one iteration are 
shown in Equation 29 in which 𝑮(𝜷) =
𝝏𝒎(𝜷)
𝝏𝜷′
. 
 
 
𝒎(?̂?𝑖+1) ≈ 𝒎(?̂?𝑖) + 𝑮(?̂?𝑖)(𝜷 − ?̂?𝑖) = (𝒎(?̂?𝑖) − 𝑮(?̂?𝑖)?̂?𝑖) − (−𝑮(?̂?𝑖)𝜷) 
= 𝒗𝑖 − 𝑮𝑖𝜷 
(29) 
 
By inserting this solution to the Equation 26, the criterion function becomes 𝑞 =
(𝒗𝑖 − 𝑮𝑖𝜷)
′𝑾(𝒗𝑖 − 𝑮𝑖𝜷). Now an approximate for the estimator can be presented 
explicitly in linear form. This is shown in Equation 30. 
 
 ?̂?𝑖+1 = (𝑮𝑖
′𝑾𝑮𝑖)
−1𝑮𝑖
′𝑾𝒗𝑖 (30) 
 
For the iteration, parameters need good starting values which lie close to the true values 
of the parameters. In the estimation, the given starting values for the parameters were 
based on the range of the expected values. All the parameter values were supposed to lie 
between zero and one because the variables were scaled to the range and for the conduct 
parameters this range was set by the theory. For each of the parameters, 0.5 was given 
as a starting value, and the signs were set in accordance with the economic theory. 
 
The variance of the GMM estimator with an unspecified weighting matrix is shown in 
Equation 31 in which 𝑺 = 𝑬[𝒎(𝜷)𝒎(𝜷)′]. 
 
 𝑽(𝜷) =
1
𝑛
(𝑮(𝜷)′𝑾𝑮(𝜷))
−𝟏
𝑮(𝜷)′𝑾𝑺𝑾𝑮(𝜷)(𝑮(𝜷)′𝑾𝑮(𝜷))
−𝟏
 (31) 
 
If the optimal weighting matrix chosen, i.e. 𝑺 = 𝑾, then Equation 31 can be reduced. 
This is shown in Equation 32. (Greene 2003, 540–544.) 
 
 𝑽(𝜷) =
1
𝑛
(𝑮(𝜷)′𝑾𝑮(𝜷))
−𝟏
 (32) 
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The significance of a coefficient is based on the robust t-statistic which follows standard 
normal distribution. The statistic is presented in Equation 33 in which √𝑽(𝜷)𝒊𝒊 is the 
(i,i) block of the weighting matrix and SE refers to standard error. (Hayashi 2000, 211.) 
 
 
𝑡 =
√𝑛𝛽𝒊
√𝑽(𝜷)𝒊𝒊
=
𝛽𝒊
√1
𝑛 𝑽
(𝜷)𝒊𝒊
=
𝛽𝒊
𝑆𝐸𝑖
 (33) 
 
The efficiency of the GMM estimator is based on the optimal weighting matrix. On the 
other hand, a consistent estimator for β is needed to obtain an estimate for W. For this 
reason, the efficient GMM estimation needs to be carried out at least in two-steps. In the 
first step, a positive definite matrix is applied as an initial weighting matrix to obtain an 
initial estimate for β. It can be the identity matrix or the covariance matrix of the 
instruments. In the second step, an estimate for β is applied to obtain an estimate for W. 
(Hayashi 2000, 212–213.) In the estimation, two-step estimation was applied and the 
identity matrix was set as the initial weighting matrix. 
 
The overidentification test, i.e. the J-test, is a standard diagnostic in the GMM 
estimation. When a model is overidentified, all the moment conditions cannot 
simultaneously equal zero. The overidentification test shows whether the value of the 
criterion function is statistically close enough to zero. The test statistic is obtained by 
multiplying the value of the criterion function by the number of observations. If the 
model is correctly specified, the statistic follows the chi-square distribution. The 
degrees of freedom for the test are obtained by subtracting the number of parameters 
from the number of moment conditions. (Hall 2005, 144–145.) 
 
The stationarity of the variables and the residuals were tested with the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The test statistic is presented in Equation 34.  
 
 Δ𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝜏 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖Δ𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=2
+ 𝜀𝑡 (34) 
 
In Equation 34, term yt denotes some variable at time t, Δyt the difference between 
present and some past value at t-i, α1 the constant term, α2 the coefficient for 
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deterministic time trend τ and, εt the white-noise error. The test discovers whether the 
null-hypothesis, γ=0, is true. If it is true, there is a unit root and the process is not 
stationary. Lagged differences are included to the model until the error becomes a white 
noise process. (Asteriou and Hall 2007, 279.) Because the variables were deflated in the 
estimation, trend τ in Equation 34 was ignored. 
 
The parametric restrictions are tested with the Wald test. The test statistic in the case of 
nonlinear restrictions is shown in Equation 35 in which 𝒂(𝜷) is a vector of parametric 
restrictions. 
 
 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 = 𝑛𝒂(𝜷)′(𝑨(𝜷)𝑽(𝜷)𝑨(𝜷)′)−𝟏𝒂(𝜷) (35) 
 
The restrictions are given in form 𝒂(𝜷) = 0. Term 𝑨(𝜷) is the matrix of the first 
derivatives of 𝒂(𝜷). The size of the matrix is the restrictions times the total number of 
moment conditions. The test statistic follows the chi-square distribution. The number of 
degrees of freedom is the number of restrictions. (Hayashi 2000.) 
 
The empirical analysis implies testing which of the models fits best to the data. It was 
noted in the previous chapter that the BPT model can be derived from the MPT and the 
RPT model through parametric restrictions but a different strategy needs to be applied 
to compare the MPT and the RPT model. Two models are non-nested if a model cannot 
be obtained as a special case of another (Hall 2005, 194). Hall (2005, 194) divides the 
tests for non-nested hypotheses into two categories. First, nested models are structured 
as generalizations to comprehend different non-nested models as the special cases of the 
nested model. This is the idea of the NST model. The second category includes the tests 
in which the results from a model are explained by another. Schroeter et al. (2000) note 
that the NST model has no clear economic interpretation, and therefore it might be 
problematic if the model would reveal to be the best. Nevertheless, Hall (2005) 
mentions two tests from the second category and does not recommend using neither of 
them in the GMM context. 
 
The models can be compared with a goodness-of-fit based approach. Model and 
Moment Selection Criteria (MMSC) by Andrews and Lu (2001) was applied in the 
estimation. MMSC are based on the J-statistic, and the selection criteria penalize the 
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addition of parameters and reward the addition of moment conditions. A specification 
with the lowest value is considered as the best. MMSC are analogous to the three 
information criteria which are commonly used in the maximum likelihood context. 
MMSC are named after them. The three criteria are 
 
𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑪– 𝑩𝑰𝑪: 𝐽(𝑏, 𝑐) − (|𝑐| − |𝑏|) ln 𝑛 
𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑪– 𝑨𝑰𝑪: 𝐽(𝑏, 𝑐) − 2(|𝑐| − |𝑏|) ln 𝑛 
𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑪– 𝑯𝑸𝑰𝑪: 𝐽(𝑏, 𝑐) − 𝑄(|𝑐| − |𝑏|) ln ln 𝑛 
 
Term 𝐽(∙) is the J-statistic of a GMM model, |𝑐| is the number of moment conditions 
and |𝑏| the number of parameters. Term Q is some number greater than two. Following 
Andrews and Lu (2001), the value of 2.1 was used in the estimation. 
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4.3 Data 
In Equation 12, the consumer price of meat products was used as x2 and disposable 
income as x3. The sum of wages paid in the whole economy served as an approximate 
for the disposable income. In Equation 13, the sum of wages paid in the retail sector 
served as w2. In Equation 14, the sum of wages paid in the food processing sector 
served as v2 and the producer price of raw cow milk as v3.  
 
The consumer price of dairy products served as an approximate for the retail price, and 
the producer price of the dairy processing sector served as an approximate for the 
wholesale price of dairy products. The latter series shows the development of prices in 
the domestic markets including both domestically produced and imported products. The 
price indices are presented in Figure 3. The volume of the production in the dairy 
processing sector was used as an approximate for the quantity. 
 
Three dummy variables were included to capture additional shocks in the supply. The 
first variable captured the impact of the global food crisis in 2007–2008. At that time, 
also other commodity prices increased making the cost of production more expensive 
through higher input prices. A starting and an ending point for the period were selected 
based on changes in the prices. The wholesale and the consumer price started to 
increase rapidly in November 2007 and to decrease in September 2009. This can be 
clearly seen from Figure 3. The second dummy variable covered the period of Valio’s 
predatory pricing. According to the report of Finnish Competition and Consumer 
Authority (Kilpailuvirasto 2012) Valio started it in March 2010 and ended it in 
December 2012. The third variable captured the impact of the embargo between the EU 
and Russia which started in August 2014. All the variables are listed in Table 4. 
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Figure 3. The wholesale and the retail price of dairy products 
 
Statistics Finland provided the whole data set.1 There were 132 observations, and the 
data covered the period from January 2005 to December 2015. The variables were 
obtained in index form, and they were deflated by dividing them by the consumer price 
index. The variables had 2010 as the base year. The retail price of dairy products was 
calculated by combining all the dairy product categories. In the aggregate series, all the 
individual categories were weighted using the same weights as in the general consumer 
price index. The weights were provided by Statistic Finland (Statistics Finland b). All 
the variables were scaled to lie around one to ensure the proximity of the starting values 
and the true parameter values. The volume index of the production was divided by 100, 
whereas all the monetary values were already at the right range after the deflation. 
  
                                                 
1 To obtain the publicly available series 
 
http://pxnet2.stat.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/StatFin/?rxid=fac5971b-320e-4ec6-9863-35f813758864 
Data on consumer prices: Prices and Costs >> Consumer price index >> Consumer Price Index 
2010=100/ Consumer Price Index 2005=100 
Data on producer prices: Prices and Costs >> Producer price indices >> Producer Price Indices 
2010=100 (TOL2008) 
The producer price of raw milk: Prices and Costs >> Index of producer prices of agricultural products 
>> Index of producer prices of agricultural products 2010=100 
Data on wages: Wages, Salaries and Labor Costs >> Wage and salary indices >> Wage and salary 
indices by industry 2010=100 (TOL 2008) 
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Table 4. A list of variables 
 
  
Term Variable
q The quantity of dairy products
p w The wholesale price of dairy products
p r The retail price of dairy products
x 2 The price of meat products
x 3 Disposable income
w 2 The cost of labor in the retail sector
v 2 The cost of labor in the dairy processing sector
v 3 The producer price of raw milk
d 1
The variable capturing the impact of the food 
crisis
d 2
The variable capturing the impact of the 
predatory pricing
d 3
The variable capturing the impact of the trade 
embargo
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5 Results 
The estimation revealed that the dummy variable for the trade embargo was not 
significant and it was excluded from the final specification. This finding could be 
explained as a delay in the actual impact of the embargo. Another explanation could be 
that the domestic market was able to absorb the sudden increase in the supply. The 
overall performance of the final specification seemed plausible. Most of the variables 
were statistically significant and signs of the coefficients were consistent with the 
economic theory. The results are presented in Tables 8–11. 
 
ADF test results for the variables with 12, 18 and 24 lags are presented in Table 5. Most 
of the variables, if not all of them, were I(1)-processes, i.e. first-difference stationary. 
The null-hypothesis for the variables in levels was consistently accepted with and 
without the constant in the case of 18 lags. With 24 lags, the null was rejected only in 
the case of x3, i.e. disposable income. The variable was stationary at 5% level when the 
constant was included but the null was not rejected when the constant was excluded 
from the specification. In the case of 12 lags and no constant, the null for the variables 
in first differences was rejected at 1% level except in the case of v3, i.e. the price of raw 
milk, in which the rejection was at 5% level. Except for v3, the null was also rejected at 
least at 10% level in the case of 12 lags and the constant. However, the null for v3 in the 
first differences was rejected at 5% level in the case of 18 lags and the constant and at 
1% level in the case of 18 lags and no constant 
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Table 5. The ADF test results for the variables 
 
 
The stationarity of the residuals was similarly tested but, in this case, the constant was 
not included to the test specifications. The results are provided in Table 6. The presence 
of unit root was rejected in all the cases at least at 5% level in the case of 12 lags. In the 
case of 18 and 24 lags, all the residuals were stationary, i.e. I(0), at least at 10% level. 
The I(1) variables seemed to be cointegrated because all the residuals were stationarity. 
This implies that the results of the estimated models were not spurious. 
  
Lags Lags
12 -1.195 0.780 12 -2.775 * -2.711 ***
q 18 -1.369 0.703 Δq 18 -3.268 ** -3.056 ***
24 -1.339 0.556 24 -2.002 -1.801 *
12 -2.732 * -0.356 12 -3.124 ** -3.139 ***
p p 18 -2.228 -0.049 Δp p 18 -3.344 ** -3.363 ***
24 -1.709 -0.025 24 -2.647 * -2.665 ***
12 -2.588 * -0.027 12 -2.576 * -2.598 ***
p r 18 -2.240 0.364 Δp r 18 -3.167 ** -3.142 ***
24 -2.015 0.667 24 -2.780 * -2.688 ***
12 -1.757 0.235 12 -2.890 ** -2.869 ***
x 2 18 -1.823 0.383 Δx 2 18 -2.140 -2.118 **
24 -1.371 0.530 24 -2.026 -1.945 *
12 -4.218 *** 2.851 *** 12 -4.008 *** -3.605 ***
x 3 18 -2.410 0.915 Δx 3 18 -2.285 -2.054 **
24 -3.242 ** 1.294 24 -2.487 -2.287 **
12 -2.082 3.598 *** 12 -3.897 *** -2.625 ***
w 2 18 -1.540 0.655 Δw 2 18 -1.453 -1.219
24 -1.912 1.097 24 -1.485 -1.055
12 -0.481 1.180 12 -6.757 *** -6.697 ***
v 2 18 -1.095 0.747 Δv 2 18 -3.033 * -2.946 ***
24 -0.341 1.292 24 -3.826 *** -3.579 ***
12 -2.948 * -0.558 12 -2.241 -2.210 **
v 3 18 -2.118 -0.474 Δv 3 18 -3.011 ** -3.004 ***
24 -2.115 -0.526 24 -2.176 -2.165 **
* : p-value < 0.1
** : p-value < 0.05
*** : p-value < 0.01
No constantConstant Constant No constant
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Table 6. The ADF test results for the residuals 
 
 
The estimates were consistent between the four models, and the null of the 
overidentification test was not rejected in any of the cases (Tables 8–11). The systems 
were thus correctly specified. In the BPT model, the value of the J-statistic was 12.02 
and the respective probability value was 0.284. In other models, the probability values 
ranged from 0.218 to 0.381. The BPT model had the lowest value in MMSC–BIC and 
in MMSC–HQIC, but MMSC–AIC value was lowest in the RPT model (Table 7). 
 
Parametric restrictions needed to be considered in order to choose between the BPT and 
the RPT model. The probability value of γ is 0.219 in the RPT model and thus 
insignificant (Table 10). In the case of the NST model, the probability value of the Wald 
BPT MPT
Residuals Lags Residuals Lags
Equation 1 12 -2.718 *** Equation 1 12 -2.728 ***
18 -2.211 ** 18 -2.212 **
24 -1.79 * 24 -1.804 *
Equation 2 12 -2.091 ** Equation 2 12 -2.093 **
18 -1.814 * 18 -1.803 *
24 -1.686 * 24 -1.687 *
Equation 3 12 -3.72 *** Equation 3 12 -3.718 ***
18 -2.497 ** 18 -2.47 **
24 -2.382 ** 24 -2.362 **
RPT NST
Residuals Lags Residuals Lags
Equation 1 12 -2.765 *** Equation 1 12 -2.762 ***
18 -2.56 ** 18 -2.656 ***
24 -2.074 ** 24 -2.118 **
Equation 2 12 -2.135 ** Equation 2 12 -2.153 **
18 -1.831 * 18 -1.805 *
24 -1.76 * 24 -1.783 *
Equation 3 12 -3.656 *** Equation 3 12 -3.605 ***
18 -2.642 *** 18 -2.572 **
24 -2.104 ** 24 -1.963 **
* : p-value < 0.1
** : p-value < 0.05
*** : p-value < 0.01
Test statisticTest statistic
Test statistic Test statistic
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test statistic was 0.199 for the null hypothesis that parameters δ and γ equal zero 
simultaneously (Table 12). The null hypotheses of the parametric restrictions were not 
rejected in any of the models and this leads to the conclusion that the BPT model should 
be considered as the best. This implies that the wholesale market is competitive. 
 
Table 7. The MMSC values 
 
 
Parameter a1, which relates to the quantity in Equation 12, was negative and therefore 
correctly specified (Tables 8–11). The value of the parameter was -0.557 in the BPT 
model, while the value ranged from -0.489 to -0.548 in other models. Parameter a2, 
which relates to x2 in Equation 12, had positive sign implying that meat products are 
complements to dairy products (Tables 8–11). The value ranged from 0.261 to 0.351 but 
it was significant only in the NST model with the probability value of 0.053. Parameter 
a3, which relates to x3 and quantity in Equation 12, had positive sign as expected 
(Tables 8–11). This implies that wealthier consumers have more elastic demand for 
dairy products. 
 
Parameter b1, which relates to the quantity in Equation 13, had negative sign (Tables 8–
11). This may indicate increasing returns to scale in the retail sector. As shown in 
Section 3.2, concentration on the sector has increased, and increasing returns to scale 
may explain the concentration. The value was -0.341 in the BPT model and ranged 
from -0.278 to -0.339 in other models. Parameter b2, which relates to w2 in Equation 13, 
had positive sign as expected (Tables 8–11). This implies that the cost of production 
increases as the cost of labor increases. The value ranged from 0.235 to 0.326. 
 
Parameter c1, which relates to the quantity in Equation 14, had negative sign in the NST 
model but positive sign in other models (Table 8–11). The value was 0.059 in the BPT 
model and ranged from -0.003 to 0.06 in other models. However, the significance of the 
parameter was questionable. The probability value was slightly over 0.1 in the BPT and 
the MPT model but over 0.8 in the RPT and the NST model. This finding suggests that 
BPT -36.81 * -7.98 -21.28 *
MPT -32.02 -6.08 -18.05
RPT -34.31 -8.37 * -20.34
NST -30.21 -7.15 -17.79
MMSC–BIC MMSC–AIC MMSC–HQIC
42 
 
 
changes in the price have only negligible effect on quantity supplied. This may relate to 
the fact that the production of dairy products cannot be quickly adjusted as the price 
changes because the production is closely tied to the supply of raw milk. Parameter c2, 
which relates to v2 in Equation 14, had positive sign as expected (Tables 8–11). The 
parameter was significant at 5% level only in the NST model, but the probability value 
was over 0.1 in other models. The value ranged from 0.013 to 0.185. Parameter c3, 
which relates to v3 in Equation 14, had positive sign (Tables 8–11). This implies that the 
supply becomes more inelastic as the price of raw milk increases.  
 
It was noted that the two dummy variables had significant effect on the results. 
Parameter c01, which relates to d1 in Equation 14, had positive sign as expected, and the 
value ranged from 0.72 to 0.75 (Tables 8–11). This implies that the marginal cost of 
production was higher in the period from November 2007 to September 2009. 
Parameter c02, which relates to d2 in Equation 14, was assumed to decrease the generic 
wholesale price of dairy products although only one product category was affected. The 
sign was negative implying that the wholesale price was lower during the predatory 
pricing (Tables 8–11). The parameter value ranged from -0.038 to -0.041. 
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Table 8. The results of the BPT model 
 
  
Parameter Value
Standard 
error
Test statistic P-value
λ 1.298 0.367 3.540 0.000 [ 0.579 , 2.016 ]
a 0 1.007 0.168 5.980 0.000 [ 0.677 , 1.337 ]
a 1 -0.557 0.123 -4.540 0.000 [ -0.797 , -0.316 ]
a 2 0.261 0.172 1.520 0.130 [ -0.077 , 0.598 ]
a 3 0.285 0.079 3.610 0.000 [ 0.131 , 0.440 ]
b 0 -0.334 0.033 -10.100 0.000 [ -0.399 , -0.269 ]
b 1 -0.341 0.102 -3.330 0.001 [ -0.542 , -0.140 ]
b 2 0.326 0.046 7.030 0.000 [ 0.235 , 0.417 ]
c 0 0.879 0.038 23.420 0.000 [ 0.805 , 0.953 ]
c 1 0.059 0.036 1.620 0.105 [ -0.012 , 0.130 ]
c 2 0.013 0.024 0.560 0.578 [ -0.033 , 0.060 ]
c 3 0.078 0.024 3.320 0.001 [ 0.032 , 0.125 ]
c 01 0.072 0.007 9.930 0.000 [ 0.058 , 0.086 ]
c 02 -0.038 0.005 -7.060 0.000 [ -0.049 , -0.028 ]
J-statistic: 12.020 0.284
Confidence interval 
95 %
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Table 9. The results of the MPT model 
 
  
Parameter Value
Standard 
error
Test statistic P-value
λ 1.298 0.396 3.280 0.001 [ 0.522 , 2.074 ]
δ 0.018 0.246 0.070 0.942 [ -0.463 , 0.499 ]
a 0 0.991 0.177 5.590 0.000 [ 0.643 , 1.338 ]
a 1 -0.548 0.126 -4.350 0.000 [ -0.794 , -0.301 ]
a 2 0.276 0.179 1.540 0.123 [ -0.075 , 0.627 ]
a 3 0.277 0.081 3.400 0.001 [ 0.117 , 0.436 ]
b 0 -0.328 0.033 -10.070 0.000 [ -0.392 , -0.264 ]
b 1 -0.339 0.119 -2.840 0.005 [ -0.573 , -0.105 ]
b 2 0.315 0.045 7.030 0.000 [ 0.227 , 0.403 ]
c 0 0.877 0.038 23.270 0.000 [ 0.803 , 0.951 ]
c 1 0.060 0.037 1.610 0.106 [ -0.013 , 0.133 ]
c 2 0.016 0.024 0.640 0.519 [ -0.032 , 0.063 ]
c 3 0.077 0.029 2.660 0.008 [ 0.020 , 0.134 ]
c 01 0.072 0.007 9.590 0.000 [ 0.057 , 0.086 ]
c 02 -0.039 0.005 -7.090 0.000 [ -0.049 , -0.028 ]
J-statistic: 11.924 0.218
Confidence interval 
95 %
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Table 10. The results of the RPT model 
 
  
Parameter Value
Standard 
error
Test statistic P-value
λ 1.143 0.355 3.220 0.001 [ 0.447 , 1.839 ]
γ 0.241 0.196 1.230 0.219 [ -0.143 , 0.624 ]
a 0 0.966 0.178 5.410 0.000 [ 0.617 , 1.316 ]
a 1 -0.523 0.122 -4.270 0.000 [ -0.763 , -0.283 ]
a 2 0.294 0.180 1.630 0.103 [ -0.059 , 0.648 ]
a 3 0.260 0.084 3.080 0.002 [ 0.095 , 0.426 ]
b 0 -0.290 0.040 -7.300 0.000 [ -0.368 , -0.212 ]
b 1 -0.268 0.102 -2.640 0.008 [ -0.467 , -0.069 ]
b 2 0.261 0.052 5.030 0.000 [ 0.160 , 0.363 ]
c 0 0.694 0.136 5.090 0.000 [ 0.427 , 0.961 ]
c 1 0.013 0.057 0.220 0.825 [ -0.099 , 0.124 ]
c 2 0.147 0.096 1.520 0.128 [ -0.042 , 0.335 ]
c 3 0.107 0.034 3.100 0.002 [ 0.039 , 0.174 ]
c 01 0.075 0.008 9.440 0.000 [ 0.059 , 0.090 ]
c 02 -0.040 0.008 -5.240 0.000 [ -0.055 , -0.025 ]
J-statistic: 9.633 0.381
Confidence interval 
95 %
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Table 11. The results of the NST model 
 
 
The results indicated the presence of market power on the retail market. Parameter λ 
was statistically significant in all the models (Tables 8–11). The estimate was 1.298 in 
the BPT model and ranged from 1.143 to 1.298 in the rest of the models. This implies 
that the retail market is characterized by collusive behavior. The estimate exceeded the 
value of full mark-up, i.e. one, although the theory limits the value to be one at most. It 
thus became necessary to test further whether the value could statistically equal one. All 
the 95% confidence intervals include one (Tables 8–11), and the probability values of 
the Wald test statistics varied from 0.417 in the BPT model to 0.687 in the RPT model 
(Table 12). None of the tests rejected the null-hypothesis, i.e. parameter λ equals one. 
 
Parameter δ was 0.018 in the MPT model (Table 9) and 0.129 in the NST model (Table 
11). However, the parameter was not significant in either case. This implies that 
retailers have no market power over processors. Estimates for parameter γ were 0.241 in 
the RPT model and 0.336 in the NST model. The probability value of the parameter was 
0.219 in the RPT model and 0.116 in the NST model. The parameter was significant at 
the 12% level in the NST model which could be considered as a modest evidence for 
Parameter Value
Standard 
error
Test statistic P-value
λ 1.182 0.426 2.770 0.006 [ 0.347 , 2.017 ]
δ 0.129 0.221 0.580 0.561 [ -0.305 , 0.562 ]
γ 0.336 0.214 1.570 0.116 [ -0.083 , 0.755 ]
a 0 0.906 0.185 4.880 0.000 [ 0.542 , 1.269 ]
a 1 -0.489 0.125 -3.910 0.000 [ -0.734 , -0.244 ]
a 2 0.351 0.181 1.940 0.053 [ -0.004 , 0.705 ]
a 3 0.228 0.081 2.820 0.005 [ 0.069 , 0.387 ]
b 0 -0.275 0.035 -7.900 0.000 [ -0.343 , -0.207 ]
b 1 -0.278 0.117 -2.380 0.017 [ -0.507 , -0.049 ]
b 2 0.235 0.042 5.640 0.000 [ 0.154 , 0.317 ]
c 0 0.648 0.128 5.050 0.000 [ 0.396 , 0.900 ]
c 1 -0.003 0.068 -0.040 0.964 [ -0.135 , 0.129 ]
c 2 0.185 0.093 1.990 0.047 [ 0.003 , 0.368 ]
c 3 0.103 0.041 2.530 0.012 [ 0.023 , 0.184 ]
c 01 0.073 0.009 8.220 0.000 [ 0.055 , 0.090 ]
c 02 -0.041 0.008 -5.210 0.000 [ -0.056 , -0.025 ]
J-statistic: 8.853 0.355
Confidence interval 
95 %
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market power. However, the evidence should have been confirmed by the results of the 
RPT model and by MMSC but this was not the case. Therefore according to the results, 
the wholesale market of dairy products is competitive but the retail market is 
characterized by high degree of market power. 
 
Table 12. Summary on parametric restrictions 
 
  
Model Wald statistic P-value
BPT h0: λ = 1 0.66 0.417
MPT h0: λ = 1 0.56 0.452
RPT h0: λ = 1 0.16 0.687
NST h0: λ = 1 0.18 0.669
NST h0: γ = δ = 0 3.23 0.199
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6 Conclusions and Discussion 
This study examined whether the processors and the retailers have market power in the 
Finnish dairy chain. The analysis considered the wholesale and the retail market of dairy 
products. The dairy processing and the retail sector in Finland are highly 
concentrated,and strong presumptions about market power would have been misleading. 
The study of IO and NEIO provided methodological framework for the study. The 
approach by Schroeter et al. (2000) was applied in the empirical analysis, and the 
estimation was carried out using GMM. The results indicate that the retailers have 
market power over the consumers, but there was no evidence for market power in the 
wholesale market. According to the estimates, retailers employ full mark-up in the retail 
market, and the market is thus characterized by collusive behavior. 
 
Importance of further research is emphasized for three reasons. Firstly, Perekhozhuk et 
al. (2016) remind that the results of a NEIO model may be sensitive and propose 
comparing different specifications and estimation methods. It is left for the future 
research whether the results of this study are sensitive towards different models and 
estimation methods. Another reason is that different approaches allow relaxing some of 
the restrictive assumptions of the approach of Schroeter et al. (2000). Ideally, panel data 
should be applied as discussed by Kaiser and Suzuki (2006, 347). Dynamic models 
would allow observing temporal changes in market power and short run dynamics in 
general. Furthermore, linear supply and demand functions could be replaced by e.g. 
transcendental logarithmic function or almost ideal demand system. Also, maximum 
likelihood or some other estimation method could be used instead of GMM. 
 
Instead of considering dairy products as a generic group, the research could focus on a 
certain product, on fluid milk products for example. However, the availability of 
appropriate data is expected to limit the future research. Unfortunately, this problem is 
not a market specific, and a researcher has very limited opportunities to obtain better 
data. As noted by Bresnahan (1989), NEIO has not oriented in detecting the causes of 
market power.  Also in this study, the degree of market power was measured but the 
causes for market power are out of the scope of the approach used in this study. 
Therefore, the causes of market power could be further examined with another method. 
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Thirdly, the attempts to examine market power in the Finnish dairy are currently few. 
Three earlier studies, which examined the degree of competition in the Finnish dairy 
chain, were found as reference for this study. The study by Kotilainen et al. (2010) 
cannot be directly compared with this study because the approaches were substantially 
different. This study was not aimed to estimate the dynamic development of market 
power and therefore cannot say anything about changes in the degree of competition. 
Ulvinen (2006) provided a Lerner index value for the dairy processing sector and 
concluded that the sector is competitive. To some extent, this finding is consistent with 
the results of this study. Čechura et al. (2015) found, on the other hand, that the Finnish 
dairy processing sector have market power over the retailers and the consumers. This 
result was not confirmed by this study. 
 
The findings of this study further imply that the consumers are worse off. The high 
degree of market power may affect, not only to the consumers, but also to the 
processors and the producers. Peltoniemi et al. (2015) showed that the wholesale–retail 
sector had increased its relative share from the consumer price of dairy products during 
2008–2012. This finding supports the current conclusion about retailers’ market power, 
although market power should not be considered as the only reason for the grown 
margin. The question remains whether the prices of dairy products are about to decrease 
in Finland? To some extent, the correction already happened in 2015 (see e.g. Nielsen 
2016). However, a public debate remains whether a retail driven discount in food prices 
was made at the expense of the retailers or the producers (see e.g. Ryynänen 2016; 
MTV 2015). 
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Appendix 1: Full Derivation of the Models 
The following calculation shows in detail how to obtain Equation 15. 
 
𝑚𝑟𝑟 =
𝜕𝑝𝑟𝑞
𝜕𝑞
=
𝜕(𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖)𝑞
𝜕𝑞
 
=
𝜕(𝑎0𝑞 + 𝑎1𝑞
2 + 𝑎2𝑥2𝑞 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞
2 + 𝜖𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
 
= 𝑎0 + 2𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 2𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖 
= (𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖) + (𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 
= 𝑝𝑟 + (𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 = 𝑝𝑟 +
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑞
𝑞 = 𝑝𝑟 +
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑞
𝑞
𝑝𝑟
𝑝𝑟
= 𝑝𝑟 (1 +
1
𝜀
) 
 
The derivation of the conduct parameter was shown in Section 2.3. At this point, the 
average conduct parameter 𝜆 is simply added to the expression to make it corresponding 
to the content of Equation 7. It needs to be reminded though that the conduct parameter 
of firm i in Equation 7 needs to be considered as an average conduct. 
 
 𝑝𝑟 (1 +
1
𝜀
) ⇒ 𝑝𝑟 (1 +
𝜆
𝜀
) = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 
 
The equilibrium condition in the BPT model states that 𝑚𝑐𝑝 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟. The following 
calculation shows in detail how to obtain Equation 17. 
 
𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + 𝑐3𝑣3𝑞 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂) 
𝑝𝑟 = −𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂 + 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + 𝑐3𝑣3𝑞 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 = [−𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) + 𝑏1 + 𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + 𝑏0 + 𝑐0 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜂 + 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 = −[𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1 + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + (𝑏0 + 𝑐0) + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
 
The following calculation shows in detail how to obtain Equation 18. 
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𝑚𝑒𝑟 =
𝜕𝑝𝑤𝑞
𝜕𝑞
=
𝜕(𝑐0 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝜇)𝑞
𝜕𝑞
 
=
𝜕(𝑐0𝑞 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞
2 + 𝑐2𝑣2𝑞 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑞 + 𝜇)
𝜕𝑞
 
= 𝑐0 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 = 𝑝𝑤 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 
 
The conduct parameter is added. 
 
𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 𝑝𝑤 + 𝛿(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 
= 𝑐0 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 + 𝛿(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 
= 𝑐0 + (1 + 𝛿)(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
 
The equilibrium condition in the MPT model states that 𝑚𝑒𝑟 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟. The following 
calculation shows in detail how to obtain Equation 19. 
 
𝑐0 + (1 + 𝛿)(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 
−(𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂) 
𝑝𝑟 = −𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂 + 𝑐0 + (1 + 𝛿)(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 
+𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 = −[𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1 + (1 + 𝛿)𝑐1) − (1 + 𝛿)𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + (𝑏0 + 𝑐0) 
+𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
 
The following calculation shows in detail how to obtain Equation 20. 
 
𝑚𝑟𝑝 =
𝜕𝑝𝑤𝑞
𝜕𝑞
=
𝜕𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑞
𝜕𝑞
=
𝜕(𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂))𝑞
𝜕𝑞
 
=
𝜕(𝑝𝑟𝑞 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞
2 − 𝑏0𝑞 − 𝑏1𝑞
2 − 𝑏2𝑤2𝑞 − 𝜂𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
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=
𝜕((𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖)𝑞 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞
2 − 𝑏0𝑞 − 𝑏1𝑞
2 − 𝑏2𝑤2𝑞 − 𝜂𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
 
=
𝜕(𝑎0𝑞 + 𝑎1𝑞
2 + 𝑎2𝑥2𝑞 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞
2 + 𝜖𝑞 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞
2 − 𝑏0𝑞 − 𝑏1𝑞
2 − 𝑏2𝑤2𝑞 − 𝜂𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
 
= 𝑎0 + 2𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 2𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖 + 2𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝑏0 − 2𝑏1𝑞 − 𝑏2𝑤2 − 𝜂 
= 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝑏0 − 𝑏1𝑞 − 𝑏2𝑤2 − 𝜂 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 
+𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 − 𝑏1𝑞 
= 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 + (𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1) 𝑞 
= 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 + ((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 
 
The conduct parameter is added. 
 
𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 + 𝛾(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1) 𝑞 
 
The equilibrium condition in the RPT model states that 𝑚𝑟𝑝 = 𝑚𝑐𝑝. The following 
calculation shows in detail how to obtain Equation 21. 
 
𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 + 𝛾((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 = 𝑐0 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑞 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + 𝑎3𝑥3𝑞 + 𝜖 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝑏0 − 𝑏1𝑞 − 𝑏2𝑤2 − 𝜂 
+𝛾((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 = 𝑐0 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝑏0 − 𝑏1𝑞 − 𝑏2𝑤2 − 𝜂 + 𝛾((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 = 𝑐0 
+(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 = −𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂 − 𝛾((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 + 𝑐0 
+(𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 = −𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂 − 𝛾((1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − 𝑏1)𝑞 
+𝑐0 + (𝑐1 + 𝑐3𝑣3)𝑞 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜇 
𝑝𝑟 = −[(𝛾 + 𝜆(1 + 𝛾))(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1(1 + 𝛾) + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + (𝑏0 + 𝑐0) 
+𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) 
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In the RPT model, the equilibrium price in the wholesale market is determined by the 
net marginal revenue of the retailers. The following calculation shows in detail how to 
obtain Equation 22 using Equation 16 and 21. 
 
𝑝𝑤 = 𝑛𝑚𝑟𝑟 
𝑝𝑤 = 𝑝𝑟 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂) 
𝑝𝑤 = −[(𝛾 + 𝜆(1 + 𝛾))(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1(1 + 𝛾) + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + (𝑏0 + 𝑐0) + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝑐2𝑣2 
+ ∑ 𝑐0𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ (𝜂 + 𝜇) + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − (𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑏2𝑤2 + 𝜂) 
𝑝𝑤 = −𝛾(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝛾𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝑏1𝑞 + 𝛾𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑐1𝑞 + 𝑐3𝑣3𝑞 
−𝑏1𝑞 + 𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝑐0 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇 
𝑝𝑤 = −𝛾(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 − 𝛾𝜆(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3)𝑞 + 𝛾𝑏1𝑞 + 𝑐1𝑞 + 𝑐3𝑣3𝑞 + 𝑐0 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇 
𝑝𝑤 = −[𝛾(1 + 𝜆)(𝑎1 + 𝑎3𝑥3) − (𝑏1𝛾 + 𝑐1) − 𝑐3𝑣3]𝑞 + 𝑐0 + 𝑐2𝑣2 + ∑ 𝑐0𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇 
 
